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FEDERAL PROTECTIONS OF
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN LOCAL
ELECTIONS
SHELDON GARDNER* & CELESTE

M.

EBERS**

INTRODUCTION

As a result of the constitutional grant of authority in 1791 to
the states to conduct elections for both federal and local offices,
the states have possessed almost unlimited power, subject only
to amendments to the United States Constitution.' With the
passage of the fourteenth amendment, a new federalism developed. The citizens of the United States, as citizens of their state
of residency, would now be protected by the federal courts. As
this doctrine expanded and the courts entered the "political
thicket," those rights of citizenship dealing with elections became subject to the overview of the federal judiciary. Thus, in
slightly over a quarter of a century, the entire legal posture of
our electoral system was transformed.
Historically, in the first century of the Republic, federal
courts made few determinations involving electoral laws. The
post-Civil War constitutional amendments however, effectively
permitted federal court review of state election laws. Of particular importance was the fourteenth amendment, section 1, which
provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
* Partner in the firm of Foss, Schuman and Drake, specializing in litigation and local government law; former Chief, Civil Division, Office of the
State's Attorney, Cook County, 1973-1976. Mr. Gardner received his B.A.
Cum Laude from the University of Chicago (1946) and his J.D. from Chicago-Kent College of Law (1953). His background in the election area includes: ALI-ABA Election Law Seminar, chairman, March 1980; IICLE
Election Law Seminar, chairman; Attorney's Guide to Illinois Election Law,
UCLE, 1978 Editor; Founding Chairman of Project LEAP (Legal Elections
in All Precincts); Independent Voters of Illinois, Past Chairman; and Delegate to the 1980 Republican National Convention.
** Staff member, The John Marshall Law Review; Law student, The
John Marshall Law School; B.A., University of Illinois 1978.
1.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
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2
equal protection of the laws.

Despite the fourteenth amendment, the scope of federal jurisdiction remained undefined, until the Warren Court, in Baker v.
Carr3 entered the "political thicket." Prior to Baker, a controversy had existed as to the appropriateness of the federal government's involvement in local political activities. The
traditional or conservative position, best illustrated in 1946 by
Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green4 and his dissent in
Baker, was that federal courts should not act in those areas that
were deemed to involve political questions. Political areas were
best handled by the voters in their election of state legislators,
and not by the judiciary.5 The liberal interpretation, best illustrated by Chief Justice Warren in Reynolds v. Sims,6 was based
upon a philosophical belief in a judicial obligation to protect
those rights guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment, even
though they were political in nature.
In Colegrove, the Supreme Court declined to consider a
challenge to an Illinois reapportionment plan. Despite Justice
Frankfurter's ominous warnings, the Court in Baker moved the
courts into this political arena. Addressing for the first time the
subject of reapportionment, the Court held that a state's infringement of the citizen's right to fourteenth amendment protections became a reviewable issue. It rejected the argument
that judicially manageable standards were lacking. Justice
Brennan stated: "Judicial standards under the Equal Protection
Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to
courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to de-

2. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
3. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
4. 328 U.S. 549 (1946). "It has refused to do so because due regard for
the effective working of our government revealed this issue to be of a pecu-

liarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination."
Id. at 552. "The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Con-

gress." Id. at 556. This case was based on the Guaranty Clause of the
United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see Luther v. Borden, 48
U.S. (1 How.) 1 (1849) (Rhode Island had elected two governors).

5. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In
Baker, Justice Frankfurter relied on Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946),
which held that the equal protection clause should not be used to protect
citizens' rights to a representative form of government. The dissenters considered the case to be a political question, based upon the Guaranty Clause,
and hence not justiciable in the federal courts. They considered the equal
protection clause violation allegation to be a mere sham. Id. at 297; see
O'Neill v. Leames, 239 U.S. 244 (1915); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (1 How.) 1
(1849).
6. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The equal protection clause protects those rights
that are individual and personal in nature. The right to vote, and the right
to have it counted equally with others, is individual and personal in nature
and thus protected under the clause.
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termine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy but simply arbitrary and capricious
action."' 7 In Reynolds, Chief Justice Warren, articulated an important distinction between political questions and those involving individual rights with a political aspect. Individual rights,
such as voting, fall into the category of legal questions which are
political in nature.8 As important rights, they need to be protected regardless of their incidental political impact. The Court
noted "we are cautioned about the dangers of entering into political thickets and mathematical quagmires. Our answer is this: a
denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial pro9
tection; our oath and our office require no less of us."
In a fashion similar to that of apportionment law, the federal
courts have entertained challenges to state laws regulating elections.' 0 In Illinois, political conflict had historically existed between the dominant political faction in the Democratic party
and its opponents, both within and outside the party. Since the
political opposition manifested itself in electoral challenges, it
was common for these challenges to develop into litigation concerning the validity of state law." These challenges were fre7. 369 U.S. at 226 (emphasis in original).
8. But representative government is in essence self-government
through the medium of elected representatives of the people, and each
and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies. Most citizens can achieve this participation only as qualified voters through the

election of legislators to represent them. Full and effective participation by all citizens in state government requires, therefore, that each
citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his
state legislature. Modern and viable state government needs, and the

Constitution demands, no less.
377 U.S. at 565.
9. Id. at 566.

10. These challenges have involved all aspects of elections. E.g., American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (New Parties-signature re-

quirements); Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, reh. den.
415 U.S. 952 (1974) (Candidate-loyalty oaths); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S.
51 (1973) (Suffrage-party affiliation restrictions); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972) (Suffrage-residency requirements); Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134 (1972) (Candidate-filing fee requirements); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394
U.S. 814 (1969) (Candidate-signature requirements); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23 (1968) (New Parties-ballot access); Harper v. Virginia State Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Suffrage-poll tax requirements); Terry v.

Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (Participation in party nominations based on
race); Briscoe v. Kusper, 435 F.2d 1046 (7th Cir. 1970) (Conduct of electoral

board hearing); Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F.2d 388 (7th Cir, reh. en banc den.
1969) (Conduct of elections - ballot position); Carey v. Elrod, 49 Ill. 2d 464,
275 N.E.2d 367, appeal dismissed 408 U.S. 901 (1971) (Douglas, J., noting

probable justification) (Post election procedures - recounts).
11. See generally

ATTORNEY'S GurDE TO ILLINOIs ELECTION LAw, ILL.

INST. CLE, ch. 3, §§ 3.6-3.13 (Supp. 1979); Developments in Law-Elections, 88
HAv.L. REV. 1111 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Election Law].
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quently filed in the federal courts. It is a well-known political
maxim that the established power in a state legislature seeks to
use its enactments in the area of elections to protect its base of
power. 12 There is little difference between the actions in various
states; it is only the actors that are different.
Federal intervention was necessitated by the continued refusal by state courts to become involved in state election disputes. Most illustrative of this situation was the 1964 Illinois
case of Telcser v. Holzman.13 That litigation involved the incumbent ward committeemen of both parties in the City of Chicago
who were faced with challenges from the opposing minority faction in their respective parties. The Electoral Board hearing
challenges to the rebel committeemen accepted a new interpretation of who could sign petitions, and it sustained these challenges. When an appeal of this interpretation of the Electoral
Board reached the Illinois Supreme Court, the court maintained
that "in the absence of such an unreasonable determination by
the electoral board as to amount to fraud, its determination
under § 10-10 was final and the courts have no jurisdiction to review."'14 Thus, prior to the changes that occurred by the intervention of the federal courts, a candidate had no inherent right
of review of an unfavorable hearing before an electoral board
absent a showing of fraud. 15
This attitude by the state courts changed as a result of federal court intervention. In 1971, in Briscoe v. Kusper,16 a federal
court determined that candidates were entitled to procedural
due process rights in electoral board hearings. 17 No single example is more illustrative of the change than that which took
place in Illinois. States are now required to guarantee procedu18
ral due process rights to protect the right to vote.
12. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (geographical discrimination:
rural v. urban); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (geographical discrimination: rural v. urban); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (political
gerrymandering).
13. 31 Ill.
2d 332, 201 N.E.2d 370 (1964).
14. Id. at 339, 201 N.E.2d at 374; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 10-10 (1963) (current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 10-10 (1977), authorizes a hearing
before the electoral board).

15. It is interesting to note that Telcser subsequently gained a seat in
the Illinois legislature and was instrumental in passing a statutory right of

review. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 10-10.1 (1977).
16. 435 F.2d 1046 (7th Cir. 1971).
17. See generally notes 197-221 and accompanying text infra.
18. While the state has a legitimate interest in restricting access to the
ballot in order to maintain the integrity of the ballot and preserve an orderly election process, the Supreme Court has required that the means chosen by the state to achieve its goals be carefully scrutinized, for they

necessarily place burdens on the right of individuals to associate for the
advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters to cast
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Although the federal courts have intervened, they have
done so only to the extent of protecting individual rights. The
difference between success and failure in election law litigation
frequently rests upon a properly developed description of the
invasion of individual rights. Federal courts are reticent to challenge the state control of elections. It is imperative therefore to
examine the specific factual situation in order to determine
when and where federal courts will intervene. 19 Where individual rights are involved, the federal courts have recognized an
important state interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral process. 20 Thus, the courts have engaged in a case by case
21
analysis, balancing the individual rights and the state interest.
The key to a successful attack of state law is the skillful approach of the litigating attorney to show the loss of the fundamental right to vote. The key to a successful defense of a state
law is an equally skillful response that the law or practice is necessary to permit the state to fulfill its duty to conduct the election.
Balancing these competing interests necessitates examination of various aspects of the electoral process. These aspects
include suffrage, candidates, participation in party nomination,
new parties, conduct of electoral mechanism and post-election
proceedings. An in-depth study of these aspects will indicate
that suffrage and candidate questions usually involve fundamentally protected rights, and courts are more apt to intervene.22 Participation in party nominations and new parties,
although involving individual rights, have a more remote relationship to the right to vote. Therefore, federal courts have intervened less in these areas. 23 Finally, the conduct of the
electoral mechanism and post-election proceedings are almost
purely procedural; yet in reviewing due process violations, federal courts have intervened in these areas. 24 These aspects do
not exist separate from each other. Rather, they must be examined together to protect the individual's fundamental right
their votes effectively. Socialist Workers Party v. Chicago Bd. of Election,
433 F. Supp. 11, 16 (N.D. Ill. 1977), aff'd, 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
19. It is not enough to attack the state scheme without having a factual

situation which is almost a blatant violation of federally protected rights.
For example, factual situations involving racial discrimination are readily
apparent. However, factual situations involving age discrimination are

much less apparent. Any age requirement will necessarily be arbitrary.
See Blassman v. Markworth, 359 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
20. American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
21. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (compelling state interest is

necessary to grant the right to vote to some and not others).

22. See generally notes 32-148 and accompanying text infra.
23. See generally notes 149-77 and accompanying text infra.
24. See generally notes 178-221 and accompanying text infra.
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while preserving the state's constitutional right to conduct elections. This article will examine these aspects and how courts
address the various competing interests.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO VOTE

Before one can examine the effect of the fourteenth amendment upon election law, it is important to first note its historical
background. From the very beginning, the founders of the Republic, in drafting the Constitution, determined that while there
would be both federal and local elections, control of the time,
place, and manner of conducting federal elections would be
within the state's domain. 25 The federal courts never acknowledged that granting control of the electoral mechanism to the
states could jeopardize the federally-protected right to vote in
26
federal elections directly guaranteed by the Constitution.
As early as 1884 in Ex Parte Yarbrough,27 there were recognized protections of certain fundamental rights guaranteed to
the federal citizen. In Yarbrough, the Supreme Court in affirming the right to vote guaranteed to federal citizens noted:
[A] government whose essential character is Republican, whose
executive head and legislative body are both elective, whose most
numerous and powerful branch of the legislature is elected by the
people directly, has no power by appropriate laws to secure this
election from the influence of violence, or corruption and of fraud,
is a proposition so startling
as to arrest attention and demand the
28
gravest consideration.
Two years later, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins29 the Court, in reference
to the fundamental right to vote, stated:
[I] n all cases where the Constitution has conferred a political right
or privilege, and where the Constitution has not particularly designated the manner in which the right is to be exercised, it is clearly
within the just and constitutional limits of the legislative power, to
adopt any reasonable and uniform regulations, in regard to the
time and mode of exercising that right, which are designed to secure and facilitate such right in a prompt, orderly and convenient
manner; nevertheless, such a construction would afford no warrant
25. U.S. CONST.art. 1, § 4 provides:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by The Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
[The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such
Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by
Law appoint a different Day].
26. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886); Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
27. 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
28. Id. at 657.
29. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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for such an exercise of legislative power as, under the pretense and
regulating, should subvert or injuriously restrain the right
color 3of
0
itself.
Finally, in United States v. Classic,3 ' the Supreme Court recognized that the right to vote includes the right to have that vote
counted as cast. In particular, a primary election prior to the
general election is one wherein the voters' constitutional rights
are protected from fraud.
Through the fourteenth amendment's privilege and immunities clause, a citizen of a state has all the rights guaranteed to
federal citizens under the federal constitution, including the
right to vote. In protecting this right, federal courts have examined state restrictions on suffrage, candidates, participation
in party nominations, new parties, conduct of electoral mechanism, and post-election proceedings.
SUFFRAGE

The right to vote is basic to all aspects of elections. It is a
"fundamental political right preservative of all rights. '32 In any
case challenging part of an electoral procedure, whether the
challenge be from an individual voter, candidate, or party, the
court will determine if the fundamental right of voters has been
impaired. Historically, states have imposed restrictions on that
right. These restrictions include classifications of citizens and
property requirements.
Race, Sex, and Age
In the early years of the nation, prior to utilization of the
fourteenth amendment in protecting voting rights, the state
often imposed limitations on the vote involving entire classes of
persons. Generally, those classifications were based on race,
sex, age, property ownership, and residency. Although there is
a substantial body of case lawv concerning the constitutionality
of limitations on suffrage-race, sex, and age limitations have effectively been eliminated by passage and enforcement of constitutional amendments. 33 The fifteenth amendment 34 effectively
eradicated racial restriction on voting. The nineteenth amendment3 5 eliminated suffrage limitations based on sex. The Voting
30. Id. at 370-71.
31. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
32. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. at 370.
33. U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV and XXVI.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 provides: "The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
35. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIX § 1 provides: "The rights of citizens of the
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Rights Act of 197036 provided a relaxed age limitation from
twenty-one years to eighteen in all elections. In 1970, in Oregon
v. Mitchell,3 7 the Supreme Court had held the reduction in age
applied only to federal elections. After this decision, a state
could have had separate ballots based upon age distinctions for
federal and state elections. Although this was a theoretical possibility, it was not practical. As of 1971, this distinction has been
38
eliminated due to passage of the twenty-sixth amendment,
which allows all persons of eighteen years of age the right to
vote in both federal and state elections.
Poll Tax
Another historical limitation on the right to vote occurred
through the use of poll taxes. The poll tax was probably the last
vestige of a property or wealth requirement for voting. Although
payment of a poll tax did not presume that the payee owned
property or had considerable wealth, it was obvious that there
would be a direct correlation between the people who were disenfranchised and their lack of wealth. In effect, a poll tax denied
the fundamental right to vote to the poor and indigent. In 1937,
however, Breedlove v. Suttles 39 made clear that even after passage of the fourteenth amendment, a poll tax was permissible in
elections as a condition of voting. The court viewed the poll tax
as permissible under the state's interest in recapturing a portion
of the cost of conducting an election, by placing what was in effect a user charge upon the voter. The court ignored any fourteenth amendment claims which might have accrued by the
denial of the right to vote to persons who could not pay the tax.
In 1964, the twenty-fourth amendment 40 was passed. This
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of sex." See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Wall) 162 (1875); Graves v. Eubank, 205 Ala. 174, 87 So. 587 (1921); State ex
rel. Barnett v. Gray, 107 Fla. 73, 144 So. 349 (1932); In re Opinion of Justices,
240 Mass. 601, 135 N.E. 173 (1922); State ex rel. Polk County v. Marsh, 106
Neb. 760, 184 N.W. 901 (1921).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq. (1976).
37. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Oregon and Texas apparently were contemplating a statute limiting the right to vote in state election to those over 21 years
old.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 provides "The right of citizens of the
United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or any other State on account of
age." See Walgren v. Board of Selectmen, 519 F.2d 1364 (1st Cir. 1975);
Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565,488 P.2d 1, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1971); Totton v.

Murdock, 482 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1972); Worden v. Mercer County Bd. of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, 294 A.2d 233 (1972).
39. 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 provides:
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amendment abolished poll taxes in elections for the presidency
and congress. Thus, the effectiveness of Breedlove was limited
to local elections. It was not until 1966 that the Warren Court, in
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,4 1 completely abolished the poll tax as an unreasonable limitation which discriminated against the poor. The Court stated:
[I]t is enough to say that once a franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ....

Voter quali-

fications have no relation to wealth nor to paying this or any tax.
Our cases demonstrate that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment restrains the state from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously discriminate ....

Wealth, like race,

creed or color, is not germane to
42 one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.
The Harper Court's fourteenth amendment analysis was
such that it would have struck down discrimination based on
race or sex without regard to the existence of the voting amendments. 4 3 In Harper,the Court viewed limitations on suffrage as
they related to federal citizenship and scrutinized the degree of
discrimination that might have been consistent with the equal
protection clause. The Court referred back to Reynolds v.
Sims" when it stated:

In a recent searching re-examination of the Equal Protection
Clause, we held, as already noted, that the opportunity for equal
protection by all voters in the election of state legislators is required.... We declined to qualify that principal by sustaining this
poll tax. Our conclusion, like that in Reynolds v. Sims, is found not
should be but on what the
on what we think governmental policy
45
Equal Protection Clause requires.
In addition, aside from the constitutional guarantees provided in the several amendments, guarantees to voters under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment were
The rights of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or
other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President
or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason
of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.
See United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Tex.), affd, 384 U.S. 155
(1966) (even though the state has an interest in financing or regulating elections, it cannot restrict election).
41. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
42. Id. at 665-68. The Court recognized the fundamental right to vote
and did not hold that the poor were a suspect class. See note 89 infra.
43. U.S. CONsT. amends. XV, XIX. If the fifteenth and nineteenth
amendments had not been passed, the Court in its balancing would have
reached the same result.
44. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
45. 383 U.S. at 670.
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judicially established in three areas: residency, party affiliation,
and freehold requirements.
Residency
Residency restrictions are often imposed because "old residents" are fearful that their representation will be diluted by
"new residents" with different political objectives. Challenges
have been made to state limitations which establish durational
requirements on new residents to the total exclusion of more
transient groups, such as military personnel and students.
The state's purported interest in requiring a citizen to be a
resident has been upheld as necessary to (1) retain purity of the
ballot box; (2) protect against fraud through colonization; (3)
prepare voter lists; and (4) insure that only citizens who are priaffected by electoral demarily or substantially interested in or
46
cisions have a voice in making them.
While the state's compelling interest justifies the residency
requirement, the courts have also taken cognizance of the fact
that our nation has become extremely mobile and that it would
be improper to impose unduly long residency requirements
upon citizens' exercise of their right of franchise. The requirement would infringe the fundamental right to travel.47 Thus, the
Supreme Court, in Dunn v. Blumstein,48 struck down a Tennessee statute requiring one year of state residency as well as three
months of county residency before the right of franchise could
be exercised. The state's compelling interest justified only as
reasonable a requirement as was necessary to achieve that interest. Where less restrictive alternatives are available to
achieve the state's interest, they must be utilized.
Military Personnel and Students
State laws had provided for special treatment of military
personnel and students. While these laws allowed those persons to become taxpayers and residents, they often denied
these persons the right to choose to be residents for voting purposes. One in military service or school had a right to vote by
absentee ballot at the place of their prior or permanent domicile
46. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1970) (required one-year state resi-

dency and three-months county residency); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419
(1970) (residents of National Institutes of Health, a federal enclave, were
residents of Maryland for voting purposes).
47. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 629-31, 634 (1969); cfi. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966)
(fundamental right to travel).
48. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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49
or residency.
In Carringtonv. Rash,50 the Court held unconstitutional a
Texas statute excluding all military personnel from voting.
Texas asserted that it was too difficult administratively to deter-

49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 19.1 et seq. (1977), applies to students and
provides in relevant part:
Any qualified elector of the State of Illinois (other than one to whom an
absentee ballot has been delivered or mailed pursuant to Article 20 of
this Act) having duly registered where such registration is required
who expects to be absent from the county in which he is a qualified
elector or who is temporarily absent from the country or who because
of being appointed a judge of election in a precinct other than the precinct in which he resides or who because of physical incapacity or the
tenents of his religion in the observance of a religious holiday or who
because of election duties in the office of a state's attorney, a county
clerk or Board of Election Commissioners will be unable to be present
at the polls on the day of holding any special, general or primary election at which any presidential preference is indicated or any candidates
are chosen or elected, for any congressional, State, district, county,
town, city, village, precinct or judicial offices or at which questions of
public policy are submitted, may vote at such election as hereinafter in
this Article provided.
Each state's attorney, county clerk and Board of Election Commissioners shall compile and keep current a list of his or its officers or employees who are eligible to vote under this Article by reason of election
duties. [Amended by Public Act 79-1364, effective August 6, 1976.1
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 21-1 et seq. (1977) applies to military personnel and
provides in relevant part:
Any person in the United States Service, qualified as an elector under
Article 3 of this Act, who expects in the course of his duties to be absent
from the county in which he resides on the day of holding any special,
general or primary election at which any presidential preference is indicated or any candidates are chosen or elected, or at which questions of
public policy are submitted, may vote at such election as hereinafter in
this Article provided.
No restriction shall be required in order to vote pursuant to this Article.
For the purposes of this Act the term members of the United States
Service means:
1. Members of the Armed Forces while in the active service, and
their spouses and dependents.
2. Members of the merchant marine of the United States, and
their spouses and dependents.
3. Civilian employees of the United States in all categories serving
outside the territorial limits of the several States of the United States
and the District of Columbia and their spouses and dependents when
residing with or accompanying them, whether or not the employee is
subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1949, and
whether or not paid from funds appropriated by the Congress.
4. Members of religious groups or welfare agencies assisting members of the Armed Forces, who are officially attached to and serving
with the Armed Forces, and their spouses and dependents.
For the purposes of this Act the term "dependent" shall mean a father,
mother, brother, sister or child of voting age who is actually residing
with or is accompanying the members of the United States Service and
is financially dependent upon the member. [Amended by Act approved
August 19, 1961.]
50. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 13:503

mine if such persons were bona fide residents. The court, however, suggested that more precise tests were available to
winnow successfully from the ranks those who were not bona
fide residents.5 1
In Hall v. Wake County Board of Elections52 and Lloyd v.
Babb,5 3 the courts established that a student may not be denied
the right to vote at the place where he is attending school, if he
sustains the burden of proof of residence by declaring that (1)
he has abandoned his prior home, (2) he has the present intention of making the place where he is attending school his home,
and (3) he intends to remain in the college town at least as long
54
as he is a student there and until he acquires a new domicile.
Prisoners
In addition to military personnel and students, pretrial detainees unable to post bond are considered restricted by their
temporary "residence" in jail. The first challenge to a state's interest in restricting voting based on physical ability to go to the
polls occurred in Illinois in 1969. In McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners,55 an Illinois statute authorized absentee
ballots only for medical reasons or for those persons who were
to be out of the county on election day. The plaintiffs, Cook
County jail "residents," were unable to post bail while awaiting
trial. They were denied absentee ballots in accordance with the
Illinois statute. Although the plaintiffs asserted a denial of their
fundamental right to vote, the Court determined the record to be
too sparse to decide whether an absolute denial of the vote occurred. There may have been alternative methods of voting
available to the prisoners. Since, the plaintiffs were asserting a
right to an absentee ballot, and the classifications of people accorded such ballots were not based on race or wealth, the plaintiffs were not denied their fundamental right.
This distinction did not continue to exist. Five years later in
51. Id. at 95.

52. 280 N.C. 600, 187 S.E.2d 52 (1972).
53. 296 N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 843 (1979).
54. In Hall, the plaintiff, a student at Meredith College, was refused registration as a voter in the district where her school residence was located.
In Lloyd, a group of voters brought an action seeking a mandatory in-

junction. The plaintiffs requested deletion of student voters from the voting
rolls and stricter requirements for registering students in the future. The

court modified Hall to the extent that a student's intent to remain in the
locality only until graduation is not dispositive of whether he may vote in
that locality.
55. 394 U.S. 802 (1969). The Court held that the standard of review was
the rational basis test.
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1974, the Supreme Court, in O'Brien v. Skinner,56 announced
that a state cannot deny voters an alternative means of casting
their vote. 57 It distinguished McDonald on the basis that there
may have been alternatives available, where as in O'Brien, the
state had placed an absolute ban on persons confined in a penal
institution.
Party Affiliation
The ability of a voter to switch parties has also been subjected to equal protection review. A right to affiliate with the
party of one's choice has been recognized by the Supreme
Court, through the freedom of association clauses found in the
first amendment 58 as incorporated into the fourteenth.
Initially, primary elections were not considered constitutionally protected.59 As a result, the state's restrictions on party
affiliation in primary elections were not subject to equal protection review. When in 1941, in United States v. Classic,60 the
Supreme Court recognized primaries as constitutionally protected elections, the question of freedom of association in regard
to party affiliation emerged as a constitutional issue. Thus, the
primary restrictions imposed by states became subjected to review.
The restriction usually imposed by the state either requires
a voter to register in a party or be limited from switching parties
within a statutory period of time. The state's compelling inter62
61
est in this area is to prevent raiding. In Kusper v. Pontikes,
the Supreme Court reviewed an Illinois twenty-three month
rule. 63 The statute prohibited voters from voting in a primary if
56. 414 U.S. 524 (1974).

57. Id. at 708.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
59. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
60. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
61. Raiding occurs where voters in sympathy with one party vote in another party's primary to distort that primary's result. Taslitz, Rosario v.

Rockefeller and Kusper v. Pontikes-- Voters and Other Strangers, 23
L. REV. 838, 839 (1974).

DEPAUL

62. 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 7-43 provided in part: "No person shall be
entitled to vote at a primary:
(d) If he has voted at a primary of another political within a period of 23
calendar months next preceding the calendar month in which such primary

is held."
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they had voted in a primary of another political party within the
preceding twenty-three months. The Court struck down the
statute, holding that it had the effect of locking in the voter and
absolutely denying him the right to vote by changing his party.
Rosario v. Rockefeller,6 4 like Pontikes, involved crossover voting. The Supreme Court upheld a New York statute, 65 distinguishing it from Pontikes, in that the New York statute did not
absolutely deny the voters their constitutional right. Rather,
the New York voters were denied the right to vote because of
their failure to take affirmative action and enroll at least thirty
days prior to the general election preceding the primary they
wished to vote in. In Pontikes, there was no affirmative action
the voter could have taken to become a qualified primary voter.
The distinction between these two cases delineates the areas
where the legitimate state interest based upon the least restrictive limitation necessary to protect that interest is located.
Freehold or Property Interests
The freehold or property interest limitation on suffrage is
based upon a historical practice which limited suffrage rights to
"persons of property." This is not only irrelevent in a modern
democratic society, but is also irrational where wealth is no
longer measured by the ownership of land. This requirement
might be justified by the state's interest in limiting the electorate to those who have a pecuniary interest in the form of property ownership. 66 Rarely has a statute restricting the right to
vote in this fashion been upheld. Only in instances where a
quasi-municipal corporation which makes determinations concerning a property use or service which is paid for by user
64. 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
65. N.Y. ELEC. LAw § 186 (McKinney 1964) provides in relevant part:

All enrollment blanks contained in the enrollment box shall remain in
such box, and the box shall not be opened nor shall any of the blanks be
removed therefrom until the Tuesday following the day of the general
election in that year. Such box shall then be opened by the board of

elections and the blanks contained therein shall be removed therefrom

by the board, and the names of the party designated by each voter
under the declaration, provided such party continues to be a party, as
defined in this law shall be entered by the board, opposite the name of
such voter in the appropriate column of the two copies of the register

containing enrollment numbers for the election district in which such
voter resides ....
When all of the enrollments shall be transcribed

from the blanks to the register, the board of elections shall make a certificate upon the form printed in such register, to the effect that it has
correctly and properly transcribed the enrollment indicated on the
blank of each voter to such registers. Such enrollment shall be complete before the succeeding first day of February in each year.
66. Cipriani v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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charges has the freehold requirement been upheld. 67 Arguably,
the property holder is allowed a voice in determinations to
which the electoral process does not apply. An argument could
be made that all voters should also have a voice in the determinations which affect their environment or community.
CANDIDATES

Although there is no explicit mention in the Constitution of
the right to be a candidate, it has been recognized as one derived
from the right to vote. 68 Limitations of candidacy parallel limitations on voters;69 however, courts have permitted greater restrictions on candidates than on voters. 70 States may restrict
candidacy as long as no constitutional guarantee, such as the
right to vote, is infringed.
Courts have held that the states have the following legitimate interests regarding candidate eligibility: (1) reducing the
size of the ballot and as a necessary corollary minimizing potential voter confusion 7 l because the smaller ballot also keeps the
election to manageable proportions; 72 (2) limiting the number of
candidates helps insure that the candidate that eventually wins
will receive a majority of the popular vote; 73 and (3) advancing
the integrity of the electoral process by avoiding the potential
for frivolous candidacies. 74 Legitimate restrictions placed on
candidates may include reasonable limitations as to age, residency, filing fees, signature requisites and party affiliation. Restrictions based on race, property ownership, and loyalty oaths
are unconstitutional.
Age
Age has probably been the least controversial of all limitations both as to voters 75 and candidates. The recognition of a
67. Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist.,
410 U.S. 743 (1973); Sayler Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). These cases involved the right to vote in the elec-

tion of the governing board of a water storage district. For other examples,
see Annot., 35 L. Ed. 2d 843 (1973).
68. Gordon, The ConstitutionalRight to Candidacy, 25 U. KAN. L. REV.
545 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Gordon].

69. See notes 32-67 and accompanying text supra.
70. "If the voter-candidate relationship is relied upon, voters' rights will
be scrupulously protected while candidates' rights may not be." See
Gordon, supra note 68, at 567-68.
71. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 702, 709 (1972).
72. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 743 (1974).
73. Briscoe v. Kusper, 435 F.2d 1046, 1054 (7th Cir. 1971).
74. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
75. See notes 33-38 and accompanying text supra.
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legitimate right to set a minimum age for candidates has developed principally in school board elections where students who
are potential candidates may be barred by their age. 76 In the
absence of an age barrier erected with the purpose of excluding
large segments of the population, an issue of invidious age discrimination does not arise. 77 Arguably, a problem could arise if
a small community with either a military base or college established an age for city council candidates that would exclude
78
most students or enlisted personnel.
DurationalResidency Requirements
As most candidacy restrictions, candidate durational residency restrictions are allowed wider latitude then would be permissible for voters. 79 The courts are more appreciative of the
compelling state interest in this area.
In 1973 in Chimento v. Stark,80 the district court upheld a
seven-year residency requirement for potential candidates for
the office of govenor. New Hampshire advanced two arguments
in support of the seven-year requirement. The first was the necessity of allowing the candidate an opportunity to observe the
state, its people, its conditions, needs, and problems. The second, was the prevention of frivolous candidacies by persons with
little previous exposure to the problems and desires of the people of New Hampshire. 8 1 In balancing the state's interest with
the plaintiff's rights, the court scrutinized the residency requirement's effect on the entire democratic process and determined
76. In Blassman v. Markworth, 359 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1973), a 19 year
old registered voter wanted to become a member of the school board in the
district where he lived. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-10 (1977) requires candidates to be 21 years old. The court held the statute to be a valid exercise of
legislative power.
77. Manson v. Edwards, 482 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1973) (25 year old age
requirement for Detroit city councilman upheld).
Another age requirement in Illinois is one for judges. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 37, § 23.71 (1977) requires a judge to retire at age 70. In Trafelet v.
Thompson, 594 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 219 (1979), the Seventh Circuit upheld the right of the state to improve its judicial system. It
held that the right of government employment is not fundamental. See
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgid, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). Any denial
of the right to vote for a specific candidate was deemed incidental. Thus,
Bullock v. Carter, 440 U.S. 134 (1979), did not apply.
78. This is similar to exclusion of military personnel and students by
restrictive residency requirements. See notes 49-53 and accompanying text
supra.
79. See, e.g., Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. Supp. 1287 (D.N.H. 1974), aff'd

mem., 420 U.S. 958 (1975); Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H.),
affd mem., 414 U.S. 802 (1973); see note 70 supra.
80. 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H.), affid mem., 414 U.S. 802 (1973).
81. Id. at 1215.

19801

Federal Protections

the impact it had on voters as well as the plaintiff. The court
reasoned that the infringement was minimal in comparison with
other restrictions on candidacy. It only delayed the opportunity
to be a candidate and was not an absolute ban. The court distinguished this case from others which struck down residency requirements for candidates by noting that the seven-year
requirement only applied to the offices of Governor and Senator,
where the State's interest carried greater weight than if applied
82
to candidacies for lesser public offices.
In rejecting the plaintiff's claim that his right to travel was
infringed, the court stated: "It cannot be seriously argued that
the inability to run for Governor is a real impediment to interstate travel. '83 The office of Governor is sought by relatively few
people, and therefore the relationship between the right to
travel and the residency requirement for candidates for Gover84
nor is too tenuous to constitute infringement.
One year later, this same court upheld the same principle
when it refused to strike New Hampshire's seven-year residency
requirement for the office of state Senator. In Sununu v.
Stark,85 the court was concerned with the fundamental nature
of the state's limitation on its office holders. Since the requirements were constitutionally mandated it expressly left any
86
changes to the state's constitutional amending process.
These cases suggest that residency requirements for lesser
offices such as school board or alderman must be reasonable. A
82. Id. at 1216 n.10. These cases involved lesser state offices for which
the residency requirement was found violative of the equal protection
clause. Antonio v. Kirkpatrick, 579 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1978) (strikes ten-year
residency requirement for the office of state auditor); Alexander v. Kramer,
363 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (strikes five-year city and two-year district residency restriction for the office of City Commissioner); Wellford v.
Battaglia, 343 F. Supp. 143 (D. Del. 1972), afl'd, 485 F.2d 1151 (3rd Cir. 1973)

(five-year residency requirement for mayor's office struck); McKinney v.
Kaminsky, 340 F. Supp. 289 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (five-year residency requirement for the office of County Commissioner struck); Mogk v. City of Detroit,
335 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (strikes three-year residency requirement for membership on a City revision charter commission); Bolanowski
v. Raich, 330 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (strikes three-year residency
requirement for office of mayor). The court found further support for its

decision in the fact that the residency requirements were mandated by the
state constitution.
83. 353 F. Supp. at 1218.
84. Id. The court also distinguished this case from Dunn v. Blumstein,

405 U.S. 330 (1970), by noting that the potential numbers of voters affected
by residency restrictions are much greater than those of potential candi-

dates for governor.

85. 383 F. Supp. 1287 (D.N.H. 1974), affid mem., 420 U.S. 958 (1975).

86. Id. at 1291.
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seven-year requirement for these offices would most likely be
87
unconstitutional.
Filing Fees
In 1972, in Bullock v. Carter,88 the issue of whether excessive filing fees are a denial of equal protection of the laws was
raised before the United States Supreme Court. The Court determined that the filing fees eliminated poor candidates from
the ballot. 89 Thus, a voter would not have a choice of voting for a
poor candidate. The state's contentions in support of filing fees
were that they (1) necessarily limited the size of the ballot, (2)
frustrated frivolous candidates, and (3) helped finance the election.90 The Court noted that while the fee excluded frivolous
candidates, it also excluded serious candidates. As such, it was
too restrictive and amounted to a a denial of equal protection. 91
In 1974 in Lubin v. Panish,92 the Supreme Court decided that
while the state has a legitimate interest in keeping the ballot
size manageable, it must allow voters a reasonable choice of
candidates. To impose a filing fee would only be constitutional if
there were alternative means available for poor candidates to
obtain ballot access. Filing fees are allowable with two limitations: (1) they may not be excessive; and (2) there should be
alternatives. If there were no alternatives in lieu of the fee, it
could be unconstitutional. For this reason and others, a signa93
ture requirement is often used in lieu of any filing fee.
Signature Requirements
The courts have accepted a limitation on the right of any
candidate to file in order to show that the candidacy is a serious
one. They have upheld signature requirements imposed by
states to insure that only candidates who demonstrate initiative
87. See generally note 82 supra.
88. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).

89. Id. at 146. In Bullock, the Court noted that poor candidates were

kept from the ballot; thus denying a voter the option to vote for a candidate
unable to pay the filing fee. The Court, however, applied the strict scrutiny
test not because of poor candidates, but because of the limitations placed
upon one's right to vote. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio Bd. of Educ., 411
U.S. 1 (1973) (wealth is not a suspect class).
90. 405 U.S. at 145; Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1970); see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
91. The Court did note that financing an election is a legitimate purpose

for filing fees. However, the State had not demonstrated a need to finance
the election in this manner, as the fee varied depending on what office the
candidate was seeking. 405 U.S. at 146-47. As such, the distinction was unreasonable.
92. 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
93. See notes 94-115 and accompanying text infra.
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and voter appeal reach the ballot. 94 Thus, frivolous candidacies
are prevented. The requirement must be reasonable; the
number of signatures required may not act to prevent serious
candidates from ballot access. 95 Signature requirements on
nominating petitions often vary for independent, new party, and
established party candidates. Generally, since the purpose of
the signature requirement is to prevent frivolous candidacies,
the signature requirements for independent and new party candidates may be more stringent than those for established parties.

96

In 1969, in Moore v. Ogilvie,9 7 an Illinois statute required an
aggregate of 25,000 signatures on nominating petitions of independent candidates. It further required at least 200 signatures from each of 50 Illinois counties. The court noted, "[tihe
use of nominating petitions by independents to obtain a place
on the Illinois ballot is an integral part of her elective system."
Thus "[a Ill procedures used by a state as an integral part of the
election process must pass muster against the charges of discrimination or of abridgement of the right to vote." 98 Illinois'
purported interest was "to require statewide support for launching a new political party rather than support from a few localities." 99 The law violated the equal protection clause by
discriminating against residents of urban areas in favor of rural
areas. 10 0 The Court clearly established that geographic discrimination in obtaining signatures was not constitutionally permissible. 10 1
94. American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
95. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1970); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814
(1969).
96. See notes 159-77 and accompanying text infra. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46,
§ 7-10 (1977) provides signature requirements for state, congressional,
county, political subdivision, state central committeemen, and other lesser
offices of established parties. § 10-2 provides for signature requirements for
offices sought by new parties, and § 10-3 provides for signature requirements for offices sought by independents.
97. 394 U.S. 814 (1969).
98. Id. at 818 (citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944); United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314-18 (1941)).
99. 394 U.S. at 818; see Election Law, supra note 11, at 1149-51.
100. The court expressly overruled MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281
(1948). The issue was the same, although the vote dilution was not as great.
In MacDougall,it was alleged that 87% of the state's registered voters were
residents of the 49 most populous counties and only 13% resided in the 53
least populous counties. In Moore, the percentages were 93.4% and 6.6%
respectively. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969).
101. In Communist Party of Ill. v. Ogilvie, 357 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill. 1972),
the court struck down a statute requiring no more than 13,000 signatures of
qualified voters from any one county to be counted toward the total re-

quired for new political parties. Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 318 F.
Supp. 1262 (S.D. Ohio 1970), relied on Moore v. Ogilvie. In Rhodes, the stat-

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 13:503

A signature requirement for independent candidates where
party candidates are accorded automatic ballot access is valid.
In 1971, the Supreme Court reviewed a Georgia statute requiring
independent candidates to obtain signatures totaling 5% of the
registered voters at the last election. Candidates who won party
primaries were automatically awarded ballot positions. In Jeness v. Fortson,10 2 the Court upheld Georgia's requirement, noting that "Georgia in no way freezes the status quo, but implicitly
03
recognizes the potential fluidity of American political life.'
Further, the "premise that it is inherently more burdensome for
a candidate to gather the signatures of 5% of the total eligible
electorate than it is to win the votes of a majority in a party primary"'10 4 was not supportable. Georgia properly allowed alternative routes to the ballot, by entering a party primary or by
circulating nominating petitions, neither of which violate the
fourteenth amendment. In Storer v. Brown, l0 5 the Supreme
Court set forth the criteria used in examining signature requirements to determine whether or not they unduly restrict independent candidates. The Court stated:
[I]n the context of ... politics, could a reasonably diligent independent candidate be expected to satisfy the signature requirements, or will it be only rarely that the unaffiliated candidate will
succeed in getting on the ballot? Past experience will be a helpful,
if not always an unerring, guide: it will be one thing if independent
with some regularity and quite a different
candidates have qualified
10 6
matter if they have not.
In 1977, the Supreme Court's Mandel v. Bradley10 7 opinion
reversed a trial court decision because the Storer criteria had
not been applied. The plaintiff asserted that Maryland's law
which required both independent and party candidates to file 70
days prior to the party primaries was a violation of the right to
vote and of freedom of association. In remanding the case, the
Court noted the failure of the district court to "undertake an independent examination of the merits."' 10 8
In Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers
ute required signatures of at least 200 from each of the 30 counties, but no
more than 1/4 of the total required could come from any one county, id. at
1271; cf.Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), where the court held that Tennes-

see must redistrict because the rural vote counted much more heavily than
the urban vote.
102. 403 U.S. 431 (1970).
103. Id. at 439.
104. Id. at 440.
105. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).

106. Id. at 742.
107. 432 U.S. 173 (1977).

108. Id. at 177.
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Party,10 9 the Illinois signature requirements for both independent and new party1 1 ° candidates were challenged. The Illinois
provision in effect required substantially more signatures for
Chicago mayoral candidates than for any potential statewide office holders. The Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional to the extent that it required more signatures than the
state office candidates.1"1 '
Although minimum signature requisites are justified by a
state interest, the Seventh Circuit decided in Richards v. Lavelle 112 that Illinois' maximum signature requirement upheld
earlier in Lizak v. Zadrony"13 was an irrational classification
amounting to unreasonable and arbitrary governmental action.' 1 4 The court rejected two proposed state interests for the
requirement. First, it was suggested that the limitation prevented one candidate from monopolizing signatures. The court
noted there was no restriction on the number of petitions a voter
could sign, nor was there any suggestion that this was other
than a possibility. Second, it was proposed that the requirement
promoted an orderly election procedure by reducing the number
of objections, thus providing the Electoral Board with administrative convenience. The court noted that removal from the ballot was a "draconian sanction""15 which did not serve the
purpose of this state interest. Rather, less drastic means, such
as concluding the objection hearing as soon as the minimum requirement was reached, would better achieve the administrative
convenience.
Race
In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,116 the Supreme Court resolved
the problems of racial restrictions even prior to the application
109. 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
110. See notes 159-77 and accompanying text infra.
111. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 10-23 (1977) was held unconstitutional to the
extent that mayoral candidates in Chicago were required to obtain 10,000

more signatures than candidates for governor, who were required to obtain

25,000 signatures. The court subsequently entered a consent decree authorizing 20,000 signatures for the mayoral candidates. Armor & Marcus, The
Bloodless Revolution of 1976, 63 A.B.A.J. 1109 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Armor].
112. No. 80C 154, slip op. at 8 (7th Cir. Feb. 13, 1980).
In Lizak, the court held
113. 4 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 283 N.E.2d 252 (1972).

that even though the statute lacked a rational basis, because the equal protection clause only protected against invidious discrimination, the statute
was not infirm. Id. at 1027, 283 N.E.2d at 255. See Lu- REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 710 (1977).
114. Richards v. Lavelle, No. 80C 154, slip op. at 5.
115. Id. at 6.
116. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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of the fourteenth amendment to the electoral process. Since
passage of the fifteenth amendment, no otherwise qualified
voter may be denied the right to effectively case his vote on the
basis of race. The constitutional mandate has been supplemented by the Voting Rights Act of 1965.117 Thus, those restrictions of candidates based on race have been eliminated as
unconstitutional.1 8 It is interesting to note that the initial application of the fourteenth amendment in Baker v. Carrgrew out of
Gomillion v. Lightfoot. 1 9 In guaranteeing the rights of black
voters under the fifteenth amendment, it was logical for the
Court to take the next step to guarantee the rights of all voters
under the fourteenth amendment.
Freehold
Generally, property ownership requirements for candidates
are prohibited. 20 In Turner v. Fouche,12 1 the Taliaferro, Georgia
County Board of Education required that candidates for the
Board be freeholders. The State argued that decisions abolishing the freehold requirement for voters were not controlling for
officeholders. 1 22 The Supreme Court recognized "a federal constitutional right to be considered for public service without the
burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications. The
State may not deny to some the privilege of holding public office
that it extends to others on the basis of distinctions that violate
federal constitutional guarantees."' 123 Georgia's objective of
achieving responsible participation in educational decisions
24
must be met by more "finely tailored" means.
125
The Fifth Circuit's Woodward v. City of Deerfield Beach
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq. (1976).

118. Subtle forms of discrimination which have been eliminated include
grandfather clauses; gerrymandering; white primaries (see note 153 and accompanying text infra); and literacy tests. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.

112 (1970); Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45
(1959). Another method of achieving racial discrimination is by "At-Large
Elections." In Mobile v. Bolden, 48 U.S.L.W. 4389 (1980), the Supreme Court
upheld an at-large election in Mobile, Alabama even though it was impossible for blacks to be elected. The Court held there must be an intent to discriminate under § 1971 before an election would be interfered with.
119. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). In Gomillion, the Court relied on the fifteenth

amendment.
120. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra (property restrictions
on the right to vote are unconstitutional).
121. 396 U.S. 346 (1970).

122. Those decisions abolishing freehold requirements for voters were:

Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriani v. City of Houma, 395

U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
123. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. at 362-63.
124. Id. at 364.
125. 538 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1976).
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opinion followed the Turner reasoning. In Woodward, the candidates for the office of city commissioner were required to be
126
freeholders as well as residents six months prior to elections.
Relying on Turner,the court rejected the argument that this was
an "other circumstance" whereby a freeholder requirement
could be upheld. The court stated:
We believe that "other circumstances" provided for by the
Supreme Court does not refer to other types of communities, but to
other types of public office. Offices of general governmental responsibility can never be limited tofreeholders. The exceptions, if any,
must be limited to special purpose12governments whose impact are
limited to real property interests. '
It may be noted that the candidate and voter requirement in
special purpose districts may be distinguished from other elections in that the special district is frequently a quasi-municipal
corporation based upon user charges and thus may be likened to
a private business. In such cases courts may uphold the requirements that candidates own realty. 128 Of course, conflicting
arguments may deal with environmental and other community
129
impacts.
Loyalty Oaths
A loyalty oath affirms one's allegiance to the national, state,
or local government, including the laws of such government.
The most familiar loyalty oath is the one the President and VicePresident swear to on Inauguration Day. 130 Although not as familiar, loyalty oaths have been required of candidates as well as
state employees. For example, Illinois required a candidate to
affirm his loyalty and declare he was not a member of a communist organization. 13 1 In Communist Party of Illinois v. Ogil126. See notes 79-86 and accompanying text supra.
127. 538 F.2d at 1083 (emphasis added). See also Chappelle v. Greater

Baton Rouge Airport Dist., 413 U.S. 159 (1977).
128. This would be so because the Court held that a business town was
not required to adhere to the fourteenth amendment. See Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) which overruled Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968). Thus, a corporation town could
restrict the right to distribute leaflets, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551
(1972), or to picket an employer. This theory could logically be extended to

conduct of elections. Cf. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (underpinning of this case is that a corporation town does not take on the function of
the state, so there is no state action).
129. See notes 79-86 and accompanying text supra.
130. Loyalty oaths were especially prevalent in the post-World War H era
when there was a fear of communist subversion.
131. Illinois' loyalty oath provision was declared vague and overbroad in
Communist Party of Ill. v. Ogilvie, 357 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill. 1972). Subsequently, the legislature enacted a provision which precludes believing in
the overthrow of the government by any unlawful means. ILI_ REv. STAT. ch.
46, § 7-10.1 (1977) is of questionable validty in light of the Supreme Court's
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vie,132 the statute was held unconstitutional on the basis that it
was vague and overbroad. The Supreme Court avoided determining the constitutionality per se of loyalty oaths until 1974.
In Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 133 the statute
in question stated:
No existing or newly organized political party or organization shall
be permitted on or to have the names of its candidates printed on
the ballot used at any election until it has filed an affidavit, by its
officers, under oath, that it does not advocate the overthrow
of local,
34
state or national government by force or violence.'
The Court held the oath unconstitutional and stated: "The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or a
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing 135
imminent lawless action and is likely to produce
such action."'
Recognizing that although the states have great discretion
in regulating elections but that they may not infringe basic constitutional rights, the Court declared the loyalty oath unconstitutional. The burden imposed on ballot access, freedom of
association, and the right to cast a meaningful vote merely be36
cause of a belief, is a substantial infringement of those rights.
In the future under Whitcomb, loyalty oaths will most certainly
be unconstitutional.
Party Affiliation
A state requirement precluding eligibility for candidacy in a
political primary for persons who have requested a primary ballot of any other party at a primary election held within a certain
period of time has been challenged upon the basis of the candidate's freedom of association. In Bendinger v. Ogilvie,137 the
plaintiffs asserted that an Illinois statute of this type unconstitutionally restricted their freedom of association and their right to
vote. The district court characterized freedom of association as
the freedom to associate freely in organizations which espouse a
particular point of view. Noting that the state had shown a compelling state interest to justify restrictions on this right to associate and that there were no less restrictive alternatives, the
decision in Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, reh. den. 415
U.S. 952 (1974); see Annot., 19 L. Ed. 1333 (1968).
132. 357 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
133. 414 U.S. 441, reh. den. 415 U.S. 952 (1974).
134. Id. at 442-43.
135. Id. at 448.
136. Id. at 440-50.
137. 335 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ill. 1971).

1980l

Federal Protections

court upheld the statute. The compelling state interests offered
by Illinois and accepted by the court were to: (1) prevent subversion of the electoral process; (2) limit the elective process to
manageable proportions; (3) eliminate potential confusion
which could result in a mockery of the election process; and (4)
protect the party system. 138 Most importantly, the court recognized that "the state's interest in limiting candidates from
switching parties . . . is greater than its interest in limiting voters from switching parties . .. Thus, it is not inconsistent to
prevent candidates from switching parties from election to elec1 39
tion and at the same time permit voters to do so."
At the same time, in Lippitt v. Cipollone,140 the Ohio district
court upheld an Ohio statute which precluded individuals from
candidacy in a party primary "if such individual voted as a member of a different political party at any primary election within
the next preceding four calendar years."' 14 1142This decision was
summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Lippitt was reaffirmed in 1974 in Storer v. Brown.143 An action was brought by persons who sought ballot positions as independent candidates for President and Vice-President and for
the United States Congress. They challenged the constitutionality of California statutes forbidding ballot position in a general
election to an independent candidate if he had had a registered
affiliation with a qualified political party at any time within one
year prior to the preceding primary election. In sustaining the
statute, the court recognized the state's purpose was to "winnow
out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates."'144 The end
138. Id. at 575.
139. Id. at 576. The court stated:

The state's interest in preserving a vigorous and competitive two-party
system is fostered by the requirement that candidates demonstrate a
certain loyalty and attachment to the party in whose primary they are
running; [It] cannot be said of voters, however, who should be freer to

demonstrate their changes in political attitude by voting for popular
candidates or against unpopular candidates in any party's primary election.
Id. The alternative of requiring a potential candidate to take an oath was
rejected as susceptible to possible misinterpretation and abuse. A shorter
period of time was rejected on the grounds that it is better left to the judgment of the legislature.
140. 337 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd mem., 404 U.S. 1032 (1972)

(Douglas, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 1407.

142. 404 U.S. 1032 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

143. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
144. Id. at 735. "The general election ballot is reserved for major strug-

gles; it is not a continuing forum for intraparty feuds." Id. The requirement
achieves this goal by preventing losers from obtaining ballot access, as an
independent candidate.
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result "furthers the state's interest in the stability of the political system," and that interest outweighs the interest the candidate and his supporters may have in making a later rather than
145
early decision to seek ballot access.
146
Finally, in Sperling v. County Officers Electoral Board,
the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that Bendinger and Lippitt predated Kusper v. Pontikes147 which struck the party affiliation requirements in Illinois with respect to voters. The court
further recognized that Pontikes did not indicate that it was to
be applied to candidates. The Illinois Supreme Court, addressing the statute partially invalidated by Pontikes, ruled that the
partial invalidation as a matter of state law had made the entire
statutory scheme covering changes of party by voters, petition
148
signers, and candidates invalid.
Since the federal courts have intervened in elections, they
have limited the right of states to place requirements on candidates. Although states can restrict candidates more readily than
voters they must conform to the standard of reasonableness.
States, however, do retain enough power to protect their interests.
PARTICIPATION IN NOMINATION PROCEDURES

Traditionally, nomination procedures of political parties
have been left to the inner workings of the party. Where there is
a compelling state interest, however, states have intervened in
this process. 49 Federal courts have left the regulation of the
nomination process to the political party except where individual rights are infringed. 5 0 As a result, nominating procedures
5
differ among parties and even within parties.' '
145. Id. at 736. The Court also noted that California's scheme did not discriminate between independent and party candidates, for although the
route to the ballot varied, the party candidate was required to be disaffili-

ated for a longer period of time. It is important to distinguish the cases
involving the right of a candidate to run as an independent and the right of
the voters to form a new political party. See notes 160-77 infra.
146. 57 Ill. 2d 81, 309 N.E.2d 589 (1974).
147. 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
148. This resulted in Illinois permitting crossover voting in the 1980 presidential primary election.
149. Cousins v. Wigoda, 432 U.S. 173 (1977). In Cousins, the Court held
that the state's interest was not compelling in light of the national party's
interest, therefore, states have less of a right to intervene in the national
conventions.

150. See note 153 and accompanying text infra.
151. The various states offer a number of methods for choosing candi-

dates. They are: (1) the plurality primary which is used by two-thirds of
the states; (2) the majority primary, which nine states utilize, guarantees
that the chosen candidate wins a majority by utilizing minority election
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Federal intervention has been limited because the fourteenth amendment only applies to the states. The federal courts
have intervened only where the nominating procedures have
been deemed an integral part of the electoral process. 5 2 In
Texas, a series of cases 153 gradually established that pre-primary activities of a political party, which excluded blacks, became such an integral part of the electoral process that they
denied blacks the right to cast a meaningful vote, and thus were
unconstitutional.
Participation in nominations procedures differs between established political parties and independent candidates or new
parties. As a general rule, the latter nominates its representatives by petition while the former does so in a primary election. 154 In these procedures, federal courts have allowed
political parties a quasi private posture permitting self regulation. They have also allowed the states greater leeway in regulation of parties and primaries than in regulation of voters and
general elections. 55
The nomination process of a party necessarily eliminates
many political candidates. Thus within the nominating process,
there must be an effective method whereby the individual's
right to cast a meaningful vote for the candidate of his choice is
not impaired. Often the ability to participate in the nominating
process is curtailed by an affiliation requirement. Both voters
and candidates may be subject to durational affiliation require(Louisiana has adopted a majority primary system for all party and independent candidates); (3) the convention primary combination, which
nine states have adopted (in two of the states, conventions are conducted

after the primary and in the others, there are mandatory primaries after the
convention); (4) the pure convention, which seventeen states use, allowing
the party organizations to nominate (especially for the minor parties); and
(5) petitioning for independents. BALLOT
ISSUES, PROBLEMS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS,

Vol. 1 ADMImSTRATIVE
Department of Political Science

AcCESS,

Texas A & M University (1979).
152. Cf. Ripon Soc'y v. National Rep. Party, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(en bane), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976) (courts have upheld the right to
vote in the nomination process even though they have not reached the state
action issue).
153. Terry v. Adams 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1934); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1931); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1926). The Court implicitly held that
within primaries, even though not regulated by the State, the federal courts
will intervene to guarantee the right to vote. These cases, however, may
only be applicable to racial discrimination. See O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1,
4 n.1 (1972) (these white primary cases were based on the fifteenth amend-

ment).
REV. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 7-10, 10-2, 10-3 (1977).
155. There is a recognized national interest in the integrity and autonomy of the political party. States may not intervene in this process. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).

154. See ILL.
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ments. 156 The rationale supporting such a requirement is to preserve party ideology and cohesiveness. Allegedly, without a
durational residency requirement, raiders and crossovers would
be prevalent, thus distorting the party integrity. 157 Despite the
federal courts lack of involvement in the state and party regulations of nominating procedures, they will intervene to protect
158
individual rights.
NEW PARTIES

Political parties are accorded different ballot access based
upon their classification as "established" or "new." Typically in
the two-party system, established parties suggest the Democrat
and Republican parties, but this is a historical and not legal prospective. 159 A new party may become an established party, generally by obtaining a certain percentage of the votes in a general
election. 160 Then the established party procedures must be followed. 16 1 Likewise, an established party may lose its status by
elecfailing to obtain the required percentage. In the ensuing
162
tion, this party must follow the new party procedures.
Established parties are provided automatic ballot access in
every state. 16 3 New political parties often must satisfy varied
156. See notes 46-54 and 79-86 and accompanying text supra. Voters in
some states, however, may declare their affiliation on the day of the primary
election. See Election Law, supra note 11, at 1164.
157. The validity of the state interest in preventing raiding is questionable with the decline of party loyalty within the two party system.
158. In Ripon Soc'y v. National Rep. Party, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
the court held that the Republican Party formula for choosing delegates did
not violate the equal protection clause. Before reaching their holding, however, the court intimated that in normal disputes arising out of party nominating processes, federal courts will not have jurisdiction because there is
no state action. Although it reserved its ruling on this issue, it reasoned
that because Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) held that a state is without power to interfere with the delegate selection process of a national convention, that in such situations not only is there no state action, a state has
no jurisdiction to act. 525 F.2d at 575. This reasoning should not dissuade
courts from intervening in the nominating process of state officials because
states still assist the parties in the nominating process. See 525 F.2d at 616
(Bazelon, J., dissenting).
159. Historically, other major parties have included the Whigs, the Federalists, the Populists, Bull Moose, and many others. See generally MORRISON AND COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (6th ed.
1969).
160. To be an established state political party in Illinois, a political party
must have polled at least 5% of the vote statewide in the previous gubernatorial election; for congressional districts, school districts or municipalities,
the party must have polled at least 5% of the vote cast in that political subdivision's previous election. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 10-2 (1977).
161. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 10-1 et seq. (1977).

162. See id.
163. See Election Law, supra note 11, at 1123.
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electoral requirements before access to the ballot can be obtained. The purpose, similar to that of restrictions on independent candidates, is to insure a "modicum of support by the
electorate and reduce voter confusion."' 164 The litigation over restrictions placed on new parties demonstrates the conflict between the right of a voter to support the party of his choice and
the state interest in preventing parties who have not shown
voter appeal from appearing on the ballot.
The obstacles to ballot access confronting new parties are
manifested through complex procedures. These entail filing
nominating petitions containing signatures of qualified voters
within a certain period of time before a deadline. 165 Viewed separately, each restriction may seem reasonable. In Williams v.
Rhodes, 166 however, an Ohio statute was so demanding and
complex, that it was "virtually impossible for any party other
than the Democratic or Republican parties to obtain ballot access."'1 67 The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional,
as it denied the Socialist Party an opportunity, even through the
use of write-ins, to obtain ballot access.
In American Party of Texas v. White, 168 the Court upheld as
reasonable Texas' detailed statutory scheme for ballot access.
This statute provided four alternative methods for a party to
gain ballot access. The American Party of Texas failed to qualify under any method. 16 9 The Court held that this scheme was
reasonable because there was no less burdensome alternative to
insure that candidates have a significant amount of community
support.170
In American Party, the Court did not retreat from Williams.
In Williams, the only candidates gaining access to the ballot
were the Democratic and Republican candidates, while Texas
effectively allowed serious candidates to gain access.
The Court has not only required that third parties be given
ballot access, but it has also applied equal protection analysis to
other forms of discrimination against third parties. Geographi71
cal discrimination in obtaining signatures is unconstitutional.
164. American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 n.14 (1974).
165. See generally notes 88-93 and accompanying text supra.

166. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
167. Id. at 25; cf. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 177 (1977) (court must
consider on remand the difficulty of obtaining signatures).
168. 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
169. Id. at 777-79. The American Party, as a new party, had to acquire the
signatures of at least 1% of the total vote for governor in the last election or
acquire a list of participants in the party numbering 1% of the last election.
The party secured only one-third of the needed signatures.
170. Id. at 781.
171. In Communist Party of Ill. v. Ogilvie, 357 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill. 1972),
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Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party1 72 involved a challenge to an Illinois statute 173 requiring 25,000 signatures for ballot access in statewide elections. For political
subdivision elections, however, signatures of 5% of the number
of voters who had voted in the previous political subdivision
election were needed. This statute in effect required 10,000 more
signatures for a special Chicago mayoral election than for a
statewide election. 174 It was challenged as violative of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme
Court declared the statute unconstitutional insofar as it required more than 25,000 signatures for a municipal election and
noted:
The state's interest in screening out frivolous candidates must be
considered in light of the significant role that third parties have
played in the political development of the Nation. Abolitionists,
Progressives, and Populists have undeniably had influence, if not
always electoral success. As the records of such parties demonstrate, an election campaign is a175means of disseminating ideas as
well as attaining political office.
As the Supreme Court noted in Socialist Workers Party,
third parties have played a particularly significant role in American history. The importance of the third party arises where
neither of the two major parties has satisfied a significant portion of its members. For example, in 1948 the Henry Wallace
Progressive Party grew from a split within the Democratic
Party. Large numbers of liberal voters left the Democratic Party
and voted for him on the third party ticket. Shortly thereafter, a
more conservative constituency in the Democratic Party abandoned the party to support George Wallace in his third party
bid. Most recently, the Republican Party has experienced a split
with John Anderson leaving the party taking with him part of its
moderate and liberal constituency.
Where the third party structure grows out of a dissatisfaction with the established party, courts have become quite concerned with availability of ballot access. 176 The dissatisfied
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 10-2 (1977) which required 25,000 signatures with no
more than 13,000 from any one county for recognition as a new political
party, was struck down. The court acknowledged that the statute "discriminate [d] against voters of the most populous county in favor of voters in less
populous counties," and amounted to a denial of equal protection. 357 F.

Supp. at 108.
172. 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
173. The statute in question was the same as that in Communist Party of

Ill. v. Ogilvie, 357 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill. 1972); see note 171 supra.
174. 440 U.S. at 198; see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 10-2 (1977).
175. 440 U.S. at 185-86; see A. BICKEL, REFORM AND CoNTINurry 79-80

(1971).
176. See Armor, supra note 111, at 1109.
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party members are often caught in a quandry because deadlines
exist which new parties must meet to obtain ballot access. 177 A
problem is presented as to whether or not a third party can first
pursue its goals within the established party, and if that fails,
build a new party structure.
A distinction has been made between independent candidates and new parties. The courts are more likely to allow formation of a new political party wherein a losing primary
candidate is placed on the ballot than to allow a losing candidate
the right to appear on the ballot as an independent candidate.
The distinction lies in the difference between the right of the
people to form a new political party and the right of a losing candidate to run a second time. The unique method of nominating a
presidential candidate, by election of legally uncommitted delegates raises a question of whether the candidate is really running for nomination. In addition, in the general election the
voters elect legally uncommitted electors and thus only indirectly elect the candidate themselves.
CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS

Only in the last decade have the federal courts examined
the mechanism of conducting an election from the candidates'
challenges through preparation of the ballot.178 There was probably no area of election law that appeared to be as removed from
the right to vote as the conduct of elections. Local election officials argued that the electoral mechanism was sacrosanct from,
federal intervention, as this was the vehicle by which local governments carried out their constitutionally imposed mandate of
conducting elections. 1 79 The federal courts, however, utilized
the fourteenth amendment as a basis for constitutional review
of the entire electoral mechanism.
An essential aspect of the electoral process deals with challenges to candidates or parties before a quasi-judicial electoral
board or in court. In Illinois, both case and statutory law predating 1971 provided no system of judicial review of electoral board
decisions. 8 0 Thus, the unlimited authority of the electoral
board would permit arbitrary conduct. Illinois, in 1964 under
177. For example, in 1980, since Representative Anderson (R. 11l.) decided to run for president as an independent candidate, he may not be allowed on the ballot in at least five states because he failed to timely fie as
an independent candidate. Chicago Sun-Times, April 25, 1980, at 36 col. 1.
178. In Illinois, candidate challenge procedures are governed by Iz. REV.
STAT. ch. 46,

§§ 7-13, 10-8 (1977).

179. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 4.
180. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 10-10 (1977) authorizes an electoral board
hearing. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46 § 10-10.1 (1977) authorizes judicial review of
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Telcser v. Holzman,18 1 held that "in the absence of such unreasonable determination by the electoral board as to amount to
fraud, its determination ... was final and the courts have no
jurisdiction to review it."'1 82 Thus, state court relief was not
available to plaintiffs who felt the board acted in an arbitrary,
discriminatory, or negligent fashion.
Although the United States Supreme Court decided to enter
thicket" in 1962,183 it was not until 1971, in Briscoe
"political
the
v. Kusper, 8 4 that a federal court applied fourteenth amendment
protections to the electoral mechanism. Briscoe implicitly overruled Telcser. Both cases dealt with the electoral board applying new criteria to determine the validity of candidate
nominating petitions which were in effect directly contrary to
previous board rulings.
The Briscoe court specifically held that the board must
grant candidates procedural due process and allow them to rely
upon the custom, practice, and formal regulations of the board
in defending themselves from a challenge to their candidacy. 85
No longer could an electoral board change the rules on an unsuspecting candidate.
With the advent of federal court intervention to overview
the electoral mechanism in Briscoe, state courts began to scrutinze the activities of the electoral board authority. These courts
insisted that the board limit its regulation to what was necessary to protect state interests. They struck improper state regulations involving ballot access and ballot rotation.
Initially, the position of the electoral authorities was to remove candidates from the ballot for technical defects in nominating petitions such as failure to obtain a signator's middle
initial 186 or omission of a page number in a sequence. 187 This
position was gradually eroded by the doctrine of substantial
compliance. In Stevenson v. County Officers Electoral Board,188
a petition which lacked page numbers was accepted, and in Anderson v. Schneider,189 the failure of one candidate on a slate to
fulfill residency requirements was not a defect fatal to the entire
the electoral board decisions. See notes 13-16 and accompanying text
supra.
181. 31 Ill.
2d 332, 201 N.E.2d 370 (1964).
182. Id. at 339, 201 N.E.2d at 374 (emphasis added).
183. Baker v. Carr, 396 U.S. 186 (1962).
184. 435 F.2d 1046 (7th Cir. 1971).
185. Id. at 1058.
186. Madison v. Sims, 6 Ill. App. 3d 795, 286 N.E.2d 592 (1972).
187. Williams v. Butler, 35 Ill. App. 3d 532, 341 N.E.2d 592 (1976).

188. 58 Ill. App. 3d 24, 373 N.E.2d 1043 (1978).
189. 67 Ill. 2d 165, 365 N.E.2d 900 (1977).
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slate. Thus, in Illinois, electoral authorities, who had at one time
removed candidates for minute formal defects, were forced by
the court to apply the doctrine of substantial compliance.
The cases concerning ballot position of candidates and parties also demonstrate the federal court's influence on the conduct of elections. A candidate's position on the primary ballot is
generally determined via one of two ways. The first is the rotation method, 190 whereby candidates for the same office are listed
alphabetically in the first district and stepped up one position in
the second district with the first candidate dropping to the last
position. The names are rotated one position in each district.
The second method for determining ballot position is by the
temporal order of filing of candidates' petitions. 19' This method
has presented difficulties where ties occur among the candidates. In Illinois, ballot positions in tie situations were determined arbitrarily by the election official. 192 The Illinois
Supreme Court determined that ballot positions must be determined in a fair manner such as a lottery. "[D] iscrimination and
favoritism in determining sequential ballot placement would not
be tolerated.' 93 Although the courts had employed the fairness
doctrine for candidates, it was not until Sangemeister v. Woodard194 that the doctrine was applied to positions of parties in
general elections. Prior to Sangemeister, officials had arbitrarily
195
placed parties on the ballot based on political considerations.
The courts have made a further refinement by distinguishing between established parties and new parties. Board of Election Commissioners of Chicago v. LibertarianParty196 allows a
lottery system between established parties to determine the
first tier of ballot position. In a second tier, new parties were
190. This method is used in Illinois in primaries for state offices. ILL.
ch. 46, § 7-14 (1977).
191. This method is used in Illinois in primaries for county offices and
the Illinois Legislature. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 46, § 7-14 (1977).
192. Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1969) (attacked the practice in Illinois of distinguishing between those petitions delivered by mail
prior to the opening of the office and those personally presented at 8:00 A.M.
when the office opened. Only those received by mail were considered in the
tie for first ballot position); Mann v. Powell, 314 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ill.
1969),
affd, 398 U.S. 955 (1970) and 333 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. IM. 1971) (court held the
Secretary of State must determine ballot position of those tied for first position by lottery); Netsch v. Lewis, 344 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ill.
1972) (court
voided a change in the election code which provided automatic higher ballot
position to incumbent candidates).
193. Huff v. State Bd. of Elections, 57 Ill.
2d 74, 79, 309 N.E.2d 585, 588
(1974).
194. 565 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1977).
195. Bohus v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 447 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1971).
196. 591 F.2d 22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 918 (1979).
REV. STAT.
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placed below the first in the order in which nominations were
filed.
Since 1971 when Briscoe commenced review of the electoral
process, courts have revised the conduct of elections by local officials, replacing a highly political system with one that has allowed candidates procedural due process.
POST-ELECTION PROCEDURES

Post-election procedures relate to those aspects of the electoral process that survive the election. Specifically excluded
from this discussion are criminal violations of the election law
197
and civil rights claims for damages.
Historically, post-election problems included three hurdles
in invoking jurisdiction, especially federal court jurisdiction.
First, the courts had a continuing reluctance to enter into the
areas where local governments were conducting elections pursuant to state statutes mandated by the Constitution. Second,
the courts were reluctant to "tamper" with the results of the
election once the "electorate had spoken." Finally, courts had
frequently applied the mootness doctrine.
A leading case in Illinois illustrates the extent of state control over election contests. In Carey v. Elrod,198 Bernard Carey,
a defeated candidate for Sheriff of Cook County, lost by 10,479
votes out of 1,763,577 votes cast. After proceeding with discovery
allowed under Illinois statutes, he alleged irregularities and
sought a complete recount. Richard Elrod, the winner, moved to
have Carey deposit $220,000.00 to cover the cost of the recount.
The deposit was not refundable even if the election result was
changed. Carey alleged the statutory scheme which required
such a deposit was unconstitutional in that it denied him due
process and equal protection.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that this was a proper cost
to be borne by Carey. The United State Supreme Court denied
certiorari for want of a substantial federal question. 199
Perhaps the most difficult hurdle to overcome in a post-election proceeding is that the issue raised has been mooted by the
197. League of Women Voters of United States v. Fields, 352 F. Supp. 1053
(E.D. Ill. 1972). In League of Women Voters, the district court denied defendant's motion to dismiss a claim brought against election officials for capriciously allowing unqualified voters to vote, sometimes more than once.
See also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), where attorneys' fees were
awarded for civil rights violations.
198. 49 Ill. 2d 464, 275 N.E.2d 367, appeal dismissed,408 U.S. 901 (1971).
199. 408 U.S. 901 (1971) (Douglas, J., noting probable jurisdiction). If Carey had commenced litigation attacking the statute in federal court, he may
have had a greater probability of success.
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holding of the election. The doctrine of mootness requires that
''an actual case or controversy must be extant at all stages of
review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed. '200 When
there is no current injury present, there is nonetheless a possi20 1
bility that the plaintiff will suffer a related injury in the future.
More importantly, the plaintiff may not be the only individual
who is harmed by the problem under review. His status as representative of a class of individuals subjected to the same harm
is essential to resolve a problem which is "capable of repetition
'20 2
yet evading review.
In Moore v. Ogilvie,20 3 the district court dismissed an action
because the election had been held and there was no possibility
of granting any relief to the appellants. On appeal, the Supreme
Court rejected the mootness argument and stated that while the
election was over, the burden placed on the nomination of candidates for statewide offices remains and controls future elections. 20 4 In Dunn v. Blumstein,20 5 although the voter would be
eligible to vote before the next election, the "problem to voters
posed by the Tennessee residence requirements [was] 'capable
of repetition, yet evading review.'"206 The laws in question remained on the books; therefore Blumstein had standing to challenge them as a member of the class of people affected by the
then presently existing statute. 207 Thus, if a claim is made
which is "capable of repetition but evading review," a mootness
defense will be overcome. If, on the other hand, the problem no
longer exists and is not capable of repetition, the mootness defense will preclude further adjudication.
ProceduralProblems
With the advent of federal court activity in the election
arena, the litigator has additional procedural problems that re200. Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HAxv. L. REV.
373 (1974).
201. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
202. Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
203. 394 U.S. 814 (1969).
204. ' The problem is, therefore, capable of repetition yet evading review .... The need for its resolution thus reflects a continuing controversy
in the federal-state area where 'one man, one vote' decisions have thrust."
Id. at 816.
205. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
206. Id. at 333 n,2.
207. Similarly, in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974), an action was
brought by persons who sought ballot positions as independent candidates
for President and Vice President of the United States and for the United
States Congress challenging the constitutionality of certain California statutes. The Supreme Court once again refused to rely on the defense of
mootness. Id. at 727 n.8.
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late to a series of attacks or defenses that were not available in
state court litigation. The dual alternatives of state and federal
courts have created a two-track system beginning in the trial
courts and terminating in the United States Supreme Court.
It is not the purpose of this article to extensively examine
the defenses frequently raised in federal court actions. But an
awareness of these defenses will often affect strategic decisions
to be made by the litigator. If a case is commenced after the
election, the mootness defense must be overcome. If a case proceeds from a state statutory procedure, the litigant wishing to
change forums must be prepared to deal with the problems of
removal, exhaustion of state remedies, waiver, comity, and ab208
stention.
Abstention has been a particularly important doctrine in
election cases. Abstention is a doctrine employed by the federal
courts to deny hearing a claim. There are three grounds for the
denial: (1) that it is possible to construe a state statute so as to
render it unnecessary to decide constitutional or federal issues, 20 9 (2) abstention avoids interference with a complex state
system, 210 and (3) there is a need for clarification of state law
before the federal issue may be resolved.2 11 Thus, in Ament v.
Kusper,2 12 it was determined that the federal court should abstain from considering an action for a temporary restraining order where there are pending state court actions involving the
same parties and issues. 2 13 The court concluded that "Federal
Court patience and reservation in such cases not only serves to
minimize federal-state friction, but also avoid premature and
perhaps unnecessary constitutional adjudication. '2 14 The abstention doctrine was overcome in Smith v. Cherry215 and Lawlor v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners2 16 when federal
courts in Illinois declined to abstain from considering election
issues. In Smith, the court noted "abstention seems particularly
inappropriate here where the case will become moot. . . . The
delays inherent in abstention could therefore abrogate the rem208.

See generally ArORNEY'S GUIDE TO ILLINOIS ELECTION LAW, ILL.

INST. CLE ch. 3 (Supp. 1979).
209. Smith v. Cherry, 489 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
910 (1974); see Lewellyn v. Gerhardt, 513 F.2d 184, 186 (7th Cir. 1975).
210. Smith v. Cherry, 489 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
910 (1974).
211. Lawlor v. Chicago Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 395 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Ill.
1975).

212. 370 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ill. 1974).

213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 68.
Id.
489 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974).
395 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Ill. 1975).

Federal Protections

1980]
217
edy sought."

Laches may be a defense in state or federal cases. Laches is
one defense which has been applied in election litigation by the
federal courts. In Maddox v. Wrightson,218 the court denied relief to the plaintiffs for their failure to timely qualify for ballot
access under Delaware's independent candidate laws. 2 19 Noting
that "laches [reflects] the maxim 'equity aids the vigilant,' [and]
arises when there has been an unwarranted delay which would
work hardship or disadvantage to another, ' 220 the court determined the relief requested would incur "a sizeable risk of substantial harm to the public by disruption of the electoral
process.

'2 2 1

CONCLUSION

Since the entry of the federal courts into the political thicket, their election decisions have worn a well-traveled path. Prior
to federal court intervention, the states exercised exclusive jurisdiction in questions involving "political questions." Except
for enforcing the fifteenth amendment, the federal courts kept a
limited overview on the electoral process carefully watching for
racist election laws and for a few other situations that particularly affected federal elections.
After the reapportionment cases paved the way, every aspect of the electoral process received federal court review.
While neither the fears of the opponents nor the delights of the
proponents were fulfilled, the federal courts have had a substantive impact upon the process. No longer could the state continue its posture of States Rights in this area. State legislatures,
officials, and courts no longer were able to ignore their critics.
The threat of federal court intervention caused a new concern
with the rights of the candidates and voters who were bucking
the powers that predominated in the state.
On the other hand, not every challenge to the electoral system presented to the courts was successful. The federal courts
acknowledged the constitutional mandate to the States to "run"
elections. The plaintiff had a burden to show that his fourteenth
amendment injury outweighed the compelling state interests involved.
The result for the politican, the political scientist, and espe217. 489 F.2d at 1101.

218. 421 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1976).
219. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. § 4502 (1976).

220. 421 F. Supp. at 1252.
221. Id.
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cially the lawyer, was to achieve a new consciousness of a twotrack system of overview of local elections. First, one who remains in state court does so with expanded authority under new
case law. Second, in the federal court system the expanded concepts of the rights of voters and those rights derived therefrom
provide aggrieved persons and parties an alternative forum.
Both paths ultimately lead to the United States Supreme Court
as the ultimate arbiter. But now the litigant faces a more complex set of strategic and logical choices. Today's election lawyer
has come a long way and has a difficult assignment in ably protecting his client.

